Profits From The Fear Factor
The Los Angeles Times has begun a series of investigative reports on the business side of combating terrorism. Today's article in that series called "Fear Inc" describes the activities of a Russian emigre who quickly became the darling of the CIA and Congress.
In the fall of 1992, Kanatjan Alibekov defected from Russia to the United States, bringing detailed, and chilling, descriptions of his role in making biological weapons for the former Soviet Union.
As a doctor of microbiology, a physician and a colonel in the Red Army, he helped lead the Soviet effort. He told U.S. intelligence agencies that the Soviets had devoted at least 30,000 scientists, working at dozens of sites, to develop bioweapons, despite a 1972 international ban on such work. ...
He said that emigrating Russian scientists and others posed imminent threats. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, he said, several specialists went to Iraq and North Korea. Both countries, he said, may have obtained anthrax and smallpox. The transfer of smallpox would be especially ominous because the Russians, he said, had sought to genetically modify the virus, posing lethal risk even to those who had been vaccinated.
His expertise, combined with his dire pronouncements, solidified his cachet in Washington. He simplified his name to Ken Alibek, became a familiar figure on Capitol Hill, and emerged as one of the most important voices in U.S. decisions to spend billions of dollars to counter anthrax, smallpox and other potential bioterrorism agents. ...
Having raised the prospect that Iraq had acquired the ability to wield smallpox or anthrax, Alibek also was outspoken as the U.S. went to war in early 2003, saying there was "no doubt" that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. [Emphasis added]
While Mr. Alibek's contributions on Soviet research and development on biological welfare are apparently still considered reliable, his more recent assertions on the proliferation of such knowledge to other nations are increasingly being called into question for obvious reasons. Furthermore, his own research in the US has not produced any results deemed acceptable by the scientific community.
No biological weapon of mass destruction has been found in Iraq. His most sensational research findings, with U.S. colleagues, have not withstood peer review by scientific specialists. His promotion of nonprescription pills — sold in his name over the Internet and claiming to bolster the immune system — was ridiculed by some scientists. He resigned as executive director of a Virginia university's biodefense center 10 months ago while facing internal strife over his stewardship.
Still, Mr. Alibek has had quite a ride, mostly at government expense:
And, as Alibek raised fear of bioterrorism in the United States, he also has sought to profit from that fear.
By his count, Alibek has won about $28 million in federal grants or contracts for himself or entities that hired him.
Most of that $28 million came in the form of earmarks under the GOP controlled Congress. He had friends in the right places in Congress, and solidifying those friendships cost him less than $15 thousand in campaign contributions.
Huckster and conman? Perhaps not, but Mr. Alibek certainly took advantage of the fear generated after 9/11. He, and others, started a whole new industry that has burgeoned over the years, garnering millions of dollars in government contracts.
And, thanks to that deplorable congressional quirk known as earmarks, it appears that millions more will be made.
As Yakov Smirnoff would say, "What a country!"
In the fall of 1992, Kanatjan Alibekov defected from Russia to the United States, bringing detailed, and chilling, descriptions of his role in making biological weapons for the former Soviet Union.
As a doctor of microbiology, a physician and a colonel in the Red Army, he helped lead the Soviet effort. He told U.S. intelligence agencies that the Soviets had devoted at least 30,000 scientists, working at dozens of sites, to develop bioweapons, despite a 1972 international ban on such work. ...
He said that emigrating Russian scientists and others posed imminent threats. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, he said, several specialists went to Iraq and North Korea. Both countries, he said, may have obtained anthrax and smallpox. The transfer of smallpox would be especially ominous because the Russians, he said, had sought to genetically modify the virus, posing lethal risk even to those who had been vaccinated.
His expertise, combined with his dire pronouncements, solidified his cachet in Washington. He simplified his name to Ken Alibek, became a familiar figure on Capitol Hill, and emerged as one of the most important voices in U.S. decisions to spend billions of dollars to counter anthrax, smallpox and other potential bioterrorism agents. ...
Having raised the prospect that Iraq had acquired the ability to wield smallpox or anthrax, Alibek also was outspoken as the U.S. went to war in early 2003, saying there was "no doubt" that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. [Emphasis added]
While Mr. Alibek's contributions on Soviet research and development on biological welfare are apparently still considered reliable, his more recent assertions on the proliferation of such knowledge to other nations are increasingly being called into question for obvious reasons. Furthermore, his own research in the US has not produced any results deemed acceptable by the scientific community.
No biological weapon of mass destruction has been found in Iraq. His most sensational research findings, with U.S. colleagues, have not withstood peer review by scientific specialists. His promotion of nonprescription pills — sold in his name over the Internet and claiming to bolster the immune system — was ridiculed by some scientists. He resigned as executive director of a Virginia university's biodefense center 10 months ago while facing internal strife over his stewardship.
Still, Mr. Alibek has had quite a ride, mostly at government expense:
And, as Alibek raised fear of bioterrorism in the United States, he also has sought to profit from that fear.
By his count, Alibek has won about $28 million in federal grants or contracts for himself or entities that hired him.
Most of that $28 million came in the form of earmarks under the GOP controlled Congress. He had friends in the right places in Congress, and solidifying those friendships cost him less than $15 thousand in campaign contributions.
Huckster and conman? Perhaps not, but Mr. Alibek certainly took advantage of the fear generated after 9/11. He, and others, started a whole new industry that has burgeoned over the years, garnering millions of dollars in government contracts.
And, thanks to that deplorable congressional quirk known as earmarks, it appears that millions more will be made.
As Yakov Smirnoff would say, "What a country!"
Labels: Earmarks, War Profiteering
1 Comments:
At the end of April 2007, George Mason University made another decision that was felt by the biodefense students to severely impact the quality of their educational program. In response, a former university student who previously had access to and had retained copies of important documents decided to release some of those documents to the students. Since they are interesting, I am sending them to you so that the world can see more of this fascinating story.
Regards,
Ann Workman
Letter from Ken Alibek resigning as Program Director
George Mason University
National Center for Biodefense
10900 University Blvd. MSN 4E3
Manassas, VA 20110
Tel. (703) 993-8545
Fax (703) 993-4288
June 17, 2005
Dr. Daniele Struppa
Dean - College of Arts and Sciences
George Mason University
4400 University Drive
MSN 3A3
Fairfax, VA 22030
Dear Dr. Struppa,
Just over a month ago, you, Dr. Chandhoke, Dr. Bailey and I met to discuss the future of the Graduate Programs in Biodefense. The result of that meeting was that significant changes were to be made to the program beginning in the Fall 2005 semester. At the time a follow-up meeting was scheduled for a week later (then canceled) so that as a group we could finalize the changes that needed to be made. For weeks I have anxiously awaited the follow up to that meeting but I have heard nothing (I have not even received the courtesy of a response to my emails outlining my suggestions). I can only interpret this lack of attention as a lack of interest in the improvement of the program. The fall semester is two months away and there has been no word on exactly what the changes are and how they are to be implemented.
When the Graduate Programs in Biodefense were created they were based on what I believed to be a shared vision of what biodefense meant. For reasons still unclear to me, the College has decided to turn the program into something fundamentally different than what was originally intended and planned.
Over the past month I have tried to reconcile myself to these changes. As time passes, however, I am increasingly uncomfortable with the direction the program is taking and I am not comfortable directing the program. I can not jeopardize my credibility in order to appease those who have no understanding of what biothreat and biodefense are.
I have several specific concerns, the first of which is that the majority of our students already work in the fields of national and homeland security and/or chem/biodefense. These are experienced professionals who will neither be well served by, nor satisfied with a program that offers only a superficial survey of the field. In fact, these professionals already know much in the area of biodefense and came to this program to make their knowledge more sophisticated.
The issue of having a large number of appropriately trained experts in biodefense is more pressing than ever. The asymmetrical threat of bioterrorism is increasingly recognized by the U.S. government. The fact that 5-7 grams of anthrax powder sent through the mail in 2001 resulted in over $1 billion in decontamination costs alone clearly demonstrates how important this issue is.
My second concern is that dissolving the four concentrations completely does a great disservice to our current and future students. A microbiologist interested in medical biodefense has little interest in nonproliferation issues and vice versa. We’ve already witnessed such frustration when students take the core courses. The students with a life sciences background want more sophisticated scientific knowledge in the field of medical and engineering defense; while students with a policy background are more interested in biological warfare, bioterrorism threat, biodefense, and nonproliferation. At the very least, two concentrations – a science/technical and a science/non-technical – should be offered. Having the same course of study for these two diverse groups is not a good idea. I am deeply concerned about the viability of a program without at least these concentrations.
The third area of concern is regarding the decision to stop all admissions until the fall of 2006 -even though initially the decision was made to allow the continued admission of MS students. This inability to make decisions reflects poorly on the program, the College, and the University. Staff in the biodefense graduate program is bombarded daily by frustrated and even angry potential students – some in upper level positions within various government agencies and departments, asking for an explanation of such a hasty and unprofessional decision, but we have nothing to tell them because we have been told nothing.
There has been a complete shutdown in communication between the College, the NCBD administration, and the administration of the graduate programs in biodefense that I find both perplexing and frustrating. I am trying to resist the urge to assume that this lack of communication is indicative of the College’s level of commitment to the program and its 250+ students, but it is difficult find an alternative explanation.
Decisions are being made behind closed doors, leaving the program’s administration and staff increasingly worried. There is great concern over the fact that these decisions are being made without input from either the staff or from the students. Students were attracted to this program for specific reasons, to substantively change the program without their input is irresponsible and will be detrimental to the program. Our students came here to receive an education on how to best protect the country against a bioterrorist attack, which could cost many thousands of lives.
Unfortunately under such circumstances, I can no longer remain as the program’s director. I have chosen to step down as the director of the program effective July 1, 2005. I am deeply committed (and will continue to be) to the students and will continue to teach classes, advise students, and serve on committees but I can not continue as the program’s director and allow students to believe that I have either initiated or support these changes. In addition, I will gladly help the newly appointed director in whatever capacity my expertise is relevant.
I fully understand that as the program grows, changes will need to be made to keep it a thriving, productive, and profitable entity at George Mason University . However, the extreme nature of the changes that have been suggested severely damages the program to the point where I consider it irreparable. It is impossible for me to understand why someone would want to destroy this program when it distinguished George Mason University in this field from any other university in the world. This program is very close to my heart and I have dedicated several years working 12-16 hours a day, seven days a week to ensure the success of the program. I am still committed to its success, but I cannot stand idly by and watch it degrade into mediocrity.
Sincerely, Ken Alibek MD, PhD, ScD
Distinguished Professor of Medical Microbiology and Immunology
cc:
Dr. Peter Sterns
Dr. Vikas Chandhoke
Dr. Charles Bailey
Letter from Ken Alibek resigning his tenured faculty position
3/11/06
Dear Students,
In addition to my official letter of resignation, a copy of this letter I wrote for the students will be sent to President Merten, Provost Stearns, Dean Struppa, Dr. Chandhoke, and Dr. Bailey.
As you recall, last summer there were changes to the Biodefense program that I believe impacted the quality of your education and the security of the nation. As I could not support these changes (removal of courses necessary for in-depth education, loss of legitimate medical and engineering concentrations for students with catalogue rights, loss of concentrations for all students admitted Fall 2005 and later, termination of your educational support staff, and reduction of new admissions), I stepped down as Director but retained my faculty position at your request. Despite my strenuous objections over the last year, I have been unable to convince the administration of the importance of these classes that are so vital to an effective and proper Biodefense education. I know many students also complained to the administration about the changes however their efforts yielded the same null results as mine.
The seriousness of certain events (events of which you are unaware) that occurred after I protested the changes to your academic program last summer prompted me to seek resolution through the department administration, college administration, university administration, grievance committee, and the Board of Visitors but without any visible response. More recently I informed you that there were further changes within the administration that I couldn’t support and that I would begin negotiating the end of my employment with George Mason University . Though I kept the needs of the students foremost in my mind during these negotiations, the administration and I never agreed on terms. For example, I could not agree to the university’s request that I no longer permit students to seek my help as an advisor on Biodefense related matters.
Three long months ago, I filed a grievance concerning the changes to the academic program and the serious events that occurred after I protested those changes and the effects I believed they would have on the students and on national security. A couple of weeks ago, I received a belated reply that the grievance committee was scheduling a meeting for March 22nd however yesterday I received a new email from the grievance committee. The message essentially was that they were postponing the date of the meeting indefinitely and that the students planning to observe the proceedings were not welcome. I find the postponement of the meeting and the interference with students wishing to attend proceedings about their own educational program and futures unacceptable but not surprising.
It is with sadness that I must now inform you that I have decided to relinquish my position as tenured professor at George Mason University . I will continue teaching this semester however will be on vacation throughout the summer and will not be returning for classes in the Fall. My official date of resignation is August 27, 2006. Though I understand my absence will have some affect on the students, the Provost recently assured everyone of the University’s commitment and ability to provide education and dissertation support for all students. When I responded to the Provost about the letter he sent to the students, he said that I “was free to set up a meeting of (my) own, outside of class time, and discuss whatever (I) want to discuss (with the students)”. As your education and your futures are at stake, I would encourage all of you to attend the meeting with the Provost on March 20th to ensure that he is able to provide you with satisfactory answers to at least the following questions:
From what perspective is the program that existed from Fall of 2005 to current the same academic program that previously admitted students agreed to purchase?
In consideration of the numerous courses that have been cancelled, if there were sufficient courses remaining to satisfy student requirements, why are there so many students taking directed studies or directed research type classes?
How can the administration say that students admitted prior to Fall 2005 still have the option of legitimately obtaining a medical or engineering concentration when there is an insufficient number of units available to do so without having to substitute unrelated courses?
How come no new qualified faculty have been hired to teach essential Biodefense courses in the areas of:
Advanced Bacterial and Viral Threat Analysis
Advanced Response Training
Advanced Toxin, Chemical and Radiological Weapons DefenseTraining
Principles of Toxicology and Toxinology
Advanced Crisis and Consequence Management
Anti-crop and Anti-livestock Weapons Defense
Dispersal Patterns of BW Threat Agents in a Field Environment
Working within a Hot Zone
Regulations for Working Within the BSL3/BSL4 Environments
Advanced Epidemiology of a Bioterror Attack
Biodefense Technologies
Prophylaxis and Therapeutic Methods and Approaches to Development
Detection and Diagnostic Methods and Approaches to Development
Disinfection, Disinsection, and Deratization Methods and Approaches to Development
Table Top Exercises and Organization of Drills
Investigational Microbial Forensics
Principles and Methods of Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons
Export Controls
Open Source and All Source Analysis of Biological Weapons and Related Technologies
Principles of Biological and Chemical Weapon Attack Surveillance
Medical Response to Large Scale Chemical and biological Weapons Attacks
And many others
How will the current faculty who are trained in laboratory based sciences be able to assist students with their non lab-based dissertations in a field outside their expertise
If I am a member of your committee and you will not be graduating this semester, I encourage you to actively seek those individuals who will now assist you through what remains of your education and dissertations. I am sorry that all of my efforts on your behalf over the last year have been unsuccessful and regret to inform you that I have exhausted all options open to me through the university. Though there is nothing left I can do for you, do take notice that you were able to attract the attention of the Provost when you united to defend your education. It has been a pleasure working with you and I wish you every success in the future.
Ken Alibek
Excerpts from student letter prepared for Grievance Committee hearing
Dear Grievance Committee;
This composition will serve two functions: an elaboration of detail that I will present verbally and a written complaint from a Biodefense student. I have excluded names of students to protect their identities however will furnish them to the members of the committee in exchange for a written, actionable, personal guarantee of confidentiality from all members of the committee. Before providing the names of the students, my attorney will draft the appropriate agreement to be signed by all members of the committee.
In order for you to truly appreciate the depth of my conviction as I appear before you today, you must understand the personal cost I will incur as a result… I knowingly yield this award to serve the principles of justice and to give voice to my fellow students long silenced by fear of retaliation from members of the faculty and the administration.
For me, today represents the culmination of a long fight to preserve what was a very unique and necessary educational program. I started fighting for my contractual rights last summer when I spent thirteen hours carefully drafting my “letter of concern” before providing a signed copy to Dr. Alibek and another to a member of the administration I will just call “administrator”…
It is important for you to know what events took place after I submitted the letter… The administrator who received a copy of my letter of concern had a closed door meeting with a member of the faculty (I’ll just call this person “faculty”) in a very thin-walled office adjacent to mine. I could hear their conversation through the wall... I could also hear them discussing how best to approach me.
Faculty came into my office about one hour later (Having overheard the conversation, I had been waiting). Faculty wanted to discuss my work in the laboratory and said that it wasn’t acceptable. Faculty then said that if I wanted to stay in the lab that I would need to stop taking courses and stop working with Dr. Alibek...This manipulative attempt was completely expected after overhearing the conversation.
Students have seen some bewildering occurrences:
Students became suspicious when the education staff that was so vital to the students was eliminated for an unannounced reason.
One of Dr. Alibek’s student’s dissertation was jeopardized when the student didn’t request a human subject research waiver even though he wasn’t doing research on human subjects. Since the situation was so preposterous, suspicion of targeting Dr. Alibek’s students was further aroused
I have been approached on two different occasions with warnings from a student:
First warning was not to get too close to Dr. Alibek as he has really made some people angry and “retribution” was coming
Second warning was that I had really angered some people. I said that I wasn’t worried about a few angry students because they didn’t have the power to hurt me. The individual then indicated to me that it wasn’t the students, that these people had the power to hurt me. I responded that individual was then talking about administrators or faculty but even they lacked sufficient power. The individuals parting comment was for me to be careful.
Excerpts of letter submitted by Ken Alibek to Board of Visitors (regulatory body above the University President) requesting internal investigation of university practices
Dear members of the Board of Visitors;
My name is Dr. Ken Alibek. I am currently a distinguished and tenured professor at George Mason University where I have worked to establish a number of biodefense activities for the benefit of the university and the nation. Specific benefits include a new biodefense graduate program with more than 250 students, millions of dollars in new contracts with the federal government, and development of the Regional Biocontainment Lab concept. Unfortunately I must inform you that I am now considering the terms of my resignation from the university because I have witnessed a highly disturbing lack of scientific, educational, and moral values, values that are integral to the credibility of any university.
I have been diligently working since July 2005 to bring my very serious concerns to the highest levels within the university but they have yet to be officially addressed by the President, Provost, or Dean of the College of Arts and Science. The irregularities I have extensively described previously pose a serious threat to the reputation and credibility of the university and need to be addressed by the Board of Visitors as soon as possible. The most serious threats to the university include…
Esteemed members of the Board, the items listed above are only a few examples of the “irregularities” I have brought to the attention of university officials… I strongly encourage the Board of Visitors to open an internal investigation as soon as possible to prevent George Mason University from enduring the public embarrassment experienced by some other universities recently.
Mason has discord with another leading scientist regarding questionable practices at the University
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2007 13:39:31 -0400
Subject: NCBID issue
Dear Dr. Alan Merten,
In an email from December 14th, 2006, sent to Dr. Bailey with a copy to you, I have described my concerns about the questionable practices and conduct of experiments at the National Center for Biodefense and Infectious Diseases (NCBID), some of which where ordered by the US government.
I have experienced these problems firsthand and I feel that it is my duty to see that this problem is resolved. It is not my concern that speaking up against this conduct prevented me from receiving a position at NCBID, but the fact that concealment of this information from the clients is fraudulent and unethical. I have not received a response from either you or Dr. Bailey as of yet. Please, let me know what actions were taken or you are planning to take to address these problems, and if the customers were informed of this situation.
Sincerely,
Vladimir Vinnitsky
The original letter written by Vladimir Vinnitsky 14th December, 2006:
Dear Dr. Bailey:
It has been to my great disappointment, to be asked to leave NCBID. Yet it is not the fact itself, but the fashion in which it has been done and the surrounding circumstances, that are the greatest source of my discontent. In this letter I will share my perspective on the true nature of factors which ultimately led to my dismissal. There were three reasons which moved me to do so. First of all, I was referred to you by Dr. Lance Liotta, M.D., Ph.D. and Dr. Emanuel Petricoin, Ph.D., whom I have been honored to have successfully worked with at the NIH and whose opinions I value greatly. Secondly, as a renowned published scientist, with vast experience I simply cannot silently accept false accusation of professional incompetence. Finally, as a professional I feel obligated to bring to your attentions the questionable practices which I have faced while working at NCBID, and which in my honest opinion may ultimately compromise the success of your organization.
September 2006, you have offered me to join NCBID, first as an expert in the field of in vivo studies, then within a year move on to oversee a temporary animal facility Biosafety Level-2 Laboratory, and going forward Regional Biosafety Level-3 Laboratory. I gladly accepted your offer and submitted the necessary paperwork, which I was told would take about three weeks to process. In the mean while, Dr. Popov asked me to assist him with the execution of an already designed experiment, as per lack of in vivo experts on his team. Even though I had previous commitments, I agreed to provide my expertise as a part-time contractor. I carried out my part of project strictly adhering to the protocol.
After 8 days of working at NCBID I was given three days to design a new experiment titled Role of Syndecan1 in B. anthracis (Sterne) infection of DBA/2 mice even though I made it very clear that I had no previous experience in this field. I worked 14-hour days including Saturday and Sunday studying publications on anthrax and pathogenic role of syndecan1 in B. anthracis infection to produce the design of new experiment on time and in accordance with the title of the project. Dr. Popov never discussed or even mentioned my design and instead proposed and approved his own design on investigation focused mainly on toxic effect of heparin. Even though I had limited expertise in this specific area of study, relying on my vast experience with in vivo experiments I pointed out the following flaws of the approved design: 1) since heparin is not a shed syndecan1 the design would not adhere to the title of the project or tell us anything about the role of shed syndecan1 in pathogens is of anthrax infectious; 2) the experiment would produce no new information on heparin’s toxic effect in toxic doses, since it was already thoroughly researched by other scientists in the past; 3) as part of the experiment design mice would be injected with B. anthracis preincubated with heparin and protamine sulfate, however the bacteria would not be tested for viability in vitro, thus the experiment could not produce valid data. 4) a limited number of mice (95) and a large number of groups (15) could not produce statistically significant data. Considering all these flaw of the experiment design I suggested that the experiment would produce no new or useful information and would be a waste of time and funds. Dr. Popov disregarded my comments and approved his own design. As I predicted the experiment failed. I was dismissed 5 days before I was scheduled to present on the findings of this experiment.
Even though I was initially invited to only assist on a single in vivo project and at that time had not even been officially hired as a full time employee, I was assigned 3 other major projects:
1. Design of a commercial project on the investigation of Effectiveness of Olive Leaf Extract /Oleuropein for treatment of B. anthracis infectious.
2. Design of in vivo experiments in accordance with the project Use toll-like receptors as potential targets for specific and broad-spectrum protection against several biological weapons.
3. Development of animal model for gastro-intestinal anthrax infectious.
I was given three days to research and prepare a design for the project on using the Oleuropein for treatment of the B. anthracis infectious. I was working to present the project on time, but did not get a chance to do so as I was dismissed the day before the presentation was due.
Concurrently, I was working on the design of the experiments for the project titled Use toll-like receptors as potential targets for specific and broad-spectrum protection against several biological weapons. I was instructed by Dr. Popov to design the experiment to be biased to produce a conclusion that toll-like receptors are ineffective against anthrax, as the project had already been paid for by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command and he needed to close it as quickly as possible with minimal expenses. I made it clear to him that I could not accept such instructions and that I would proceed to design the experiment properly. Again I was fired before I had a chance to present my work.
To summarize, I successfully completed my part of the project that I was initially invited to participate in. I agreed to design 4 additional projects, before I had even been officially hired, which were never acknowledged, discussed or reviewed. I was dismissed before I had a chance to present any of the projects that I had been assigned and worked extremely hard on, on very tight deadlines. So, you dismissed me on the grounds of insufficient performance, yet did not even bother to verify Dr. Popov’s accusations to discover that none of my work had ever been reviewed allowing to make any sort of conclusion about my performance. At the same time I’m led to realize that Dr. Popov had alternate motivations in getting rid of me.
I would also like to bring to your attention blatant disregard for animal facility safety SOP which I observed during my work under Dr. Popov’s supervision. One of PI’s direct responsibilities is to provide training to his personnel involved in their projects using animals. Dr. Popov failed to do so completely. Considering the fact that the laboratory deals with experiments on infected animals, lack of SOP safety training puts the staff in real danger. Infected animal necropsy had often been performed outside of a laminar flow hood risking contamination. An incident took place when one of the untrained staff a member was bitten by a B. anthracis (Sterne) infected mouse. Fortunately in this case the mouse was infected with a benign strain. In contrast, when working at NIH, even my 30-year experience of working in animal testing facilities did not exempt me from taking a test on animal safety Emanuel, before I was cleared to work with animals.
In conclusion, I believe that it is obvious that my professional incompetence had nothing to do with my dismissal from NCBID. I hope that this incident will not reflect poorly on my reputation in Dr. Lance Liotta’s and Dr. Petricoin’s eyes. I also hope that my comments will be useful in uncovering and dealing with the problems present at your Laboratory.
Finally, I would like to express my deepest regrets that I did not get the opportunity to apply my knowledge, experience and effort to establish a temporary animal facility Biosafety Level-2 Laboratory and in perspective Regional Biosafety Level-3 Laboratory, which is what I had primarily been hired for. On the completion of my hiring process, I was ready to present to you a plan of implementation for establishing temporary animal facility, including paper work in compliance with Animal care and Use Regulations and Policies, Animal Care and Use Guidelines, Animal Care and Use training, SOPs, and other regulations to establish topnotch facilities.
Sincerely,
Vladimir Vinnitsky, M.D., Ph.D., D.Sc.
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