The Warrior Class
One of the more shocking news items this week was the resignation of Admiral William J. Fallon as head of Central Command. As Ruth pointed out earlier this week, the resignation was probably occasioned by Adm. Fallon's strong stance against initiating a war with Iran in any form. An editorial in today's Los Angeles Times suggests that while that certainly is a major reason for the resignation, more was involved, including some brassy infighting between Fallon and President Bush's pet general, David H. Petraeus.
The inside story of the battle between Adm. William J. Fallon, former head of U.S. Central Command, and Gen. David H. Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq, may be studied by military historians years hence. The animosity between the two top military men was personal (Petraeus reportedly thought Fallon was trying to micromanage him). It was political (Petraeus is President Bush's favorite general, while Fallon's views put him increasingly at odds with the administration). And it was strategic (Petraeus' mission is to win in Iraq, while Fallon feared an extended heavy presence there would sap U.S. strength needed to deal with other global challenges).
Predictably, the right says that Fallon, who abruptly resigned Tuesday, was insubordinate and wrong about the so-called surge.The left charges that Bush gets rid of military advisors whose counsel he dislikes. In fact, the clash of the military titans may have been less ideological than institutional. Field generals always want more troops for as long as possible, to minimize casualties and avoid giving up battlefield gains. The top brass in Washington are paid to plan the endgame and prepare for the next conflict, which is why tensions between Petraeus and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will persist after Fallon. But the clash also reflects an agonizing U.S. national security dilemma that won't be settled on Nov. 4: How long can we afford to keep fighting in Iraq, and who will be forced to take the fall for "losing Iraq" if we stop? [Emphasis added]
Adm. Fallon was charged with the long view: how to keep the military from completely breaking while managing to maintain readiness is areas not directly associated with Iraq. Maintaining troop numbers in Iraq at the current surge level simply is not feasible, nor is attacking Iran while we're bunkered down in Iraq. Admiral Fallon knew this. Gen Petraeus knows this as well, but he doesn't like those facts so he wants to ignore them, and he's due for another appearance before Congress this month. He will no doubt suggest that to maintain the "gains" the surge brought us we need to keep the levels high, at least until November, even though there has been absolutely no evidence that the Iraqi government itself has made use of the "gains" to get its act together.
And November 5th won't ultimately be the crucial date, either, according to the editorial, although the continued trumpeting of the surge's "successes" has managed to keep the Iraq War out of the campaigns so far. The real goal, according to the editorialist (and I think this is absolutely right on the money), is to keep the Iraq War going until the next administration takes office.
Presumably it will be a Democratic administration that will be left with the morass, and when that administration begins the augean task of cleaning up the mess, it will be the one charged with "losing" Iraq.
There is, after all, a legacy to be considered, and to be buffed and shined up.
The inside story of the battle between Adm. William J. Fallon, former head of U.S. Central Command, and Gen. David H. Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq, may be studied by military historians years hence. The animosity between the two top military men was personal (Petraeus reportedly thought Fallon was trying to micromanage him). It was political (Petraeus is President Bush's favorite general, while Fallon's views put him increasingly at odds with the administration). And it was strategic (Petraeus' mission is to win in Iraq, while Fallon feared an extended heavy presence there would sap U.S. strength needed to deal with other global challenges).
Predictably, the right says that Fallon, who abruptly resigned Tuesday, was insubordinate and wrong about the so-called surge.The left charges that Bush gets rid of military advisors whose counsel he dislikes. In fact, the clash of the military titans may have been less ideological than institutional. Field generals always want more troops for as long as possible, to minimize casualties and avoid giving up battlefield gains. The top brass in Washington are paid to plan the endgame and prepare for the next conflict, which is why tensions between Petraeus and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will persist after Fallon. But the clash also reflects an agonizing U.S. national security dilemma that won't be settled on Nov. 4: How long can we afford to keep fighting in Iraq, and who will be forced to take the fall for "losing Iraq" if we stop? [Emphasis added]
Adm. Fallon was charged with the long view: how to keep the military from completely breaking while managing to maintain readiness is areas not directly associated with Iraq. Maintaining troop numbers in Iraq at the current surge level simply is not feasible, nor is attacking Iran while we're bunkered down in Iraq. Admiral Fallon knew this. Gen Petraeus knows this as well, but he doesn't like those facts so he wants to ignore them, and he's due for another appearance before Congress this month. He will no doubt suggest that to maintain the "gains" the surge brought us we need to keep the levels high, at least until November, even though there has been absolutely no evidence that the Iraqi government itself has made use of the "gains" to get its act together.
And November 5th won't ultimately be the crucial date, either, according to the editorial, although the continued trumpeting of the surge's "successes" has managed to keep the Iraq War out of the campaigns so far. The real goal, according to the editorialist (and I think this is absolutely right on the money), is to keep the Iraq War going until the next administration takes office.
Presumably it will be a Democratic administration that will be left with the morass, and when that administration begins the augean task of cleaning up the mess, it will be the one charged with "losing" Iraq.
There is, after all, a legacy to be considered, and to be buffed and shined up.
Labels: Bush Legacy, Iran, Iraq War
posted by Diane at 4:17 AM
2 Comments:
Everyone is saying he was insubordinate to Dubya.
Admiral Fallon's first obligation was to protect and the defend the Constitution from enemies Foreign and Domestic.
Which would of course include illegal orders as per the UCMJ, and the will of the people. The AUMF is not war authority, our actions are not technically granted, since the actual funding is supplemental and not authorized by traditional means.
The Admiral's standing is more Constitutionally valid than that of Bush and Boss Cheney.
Fallon has upheld the highest of standards he could given the circumstances.
Suppose he wants a commander who refuses peaceful transition at home? Who would ever have imagined such a statement as that could be plausible to Americans?
Say, you think that Iran elections on the 14th had anything to do with the timing of the Admirals' departure?
BTW: try to find out when Iranian elections are going to be held. Why does it take a microsecond for the net to find the latest utterance of Geraldine but the Iranian elections requires a persistant effort? Methinks we are being managed so well that we believe it not.
Shirt
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