Al Qaeda's Birthday
Rami Khouri reminds us that this month is the twentieth anniversary of the founding of Al Qaeda in his column in the Jordan Times. It's initial founding came with the Russian occupation of Afghanistan, but it has certainly outlived that historical period. Mr. Khouri looks at the reasons why Al Qaeda is still around and in many respects still thriving.
The several phenomena that Al Qaeda represents - defensive jihad, militant self-assertion, a puritanical interpretation of religious doctrine, cosmic theological battle and political struggle to purify tainted Islamic societies - appeal to a wide variety of individuals who gravitate to its call in the same manner that zealots join any other such movements of true believers.
Coming to grips with the phenomena it represents - especially the continuing threat of terrorism - requires grasping the combination of social, economic and political conditions in local societies from which Al Qaeda recruits emanate - mainly in the Arab world, South Asia and immigrant quarters of urban Europe. ...
Over the past two decades, Al Qaeda seems to have evolved in line with trends impacting the wider world of Islamist movements, including local crackdowns in many countries, and the American-led “global war on terror” that has been defined heavily, but not exclusively, by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
These pressures to disrupt Al Qaeda have been offset by a continuation of the stressful conditions at local and national levels in many Arab-Asian societies that nourish these Salafist jihadi movements in the first place. So a more useful question than “What is Al Qaeda’s condition today?” concerns the wider trends in Arab-Asian societies that bolster Islamist radicalism by spurring five related forces:
1. The slow political fragmentation and fraying at the edges of once centralised nation-states like Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, Lebanon, Sudan, Afghanistan and Algeria, creating vacuums of authority that Islamists and others quickly fill.
2. The continued sharp disparities in local delivery of basic social services, job opportunities and security throughout much of the Arab-Asian region, creating urgent needs that Islamists are very good at meeting.
3. The impact of major nationalist issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict or the Anglo-American-led war on Iraq.
4. Police brutality and political oppression at the local level in many Arab-Asian countries (the birthplace of Al Qaeda was both Afghanistan and the prisons of Egypt).
5. Occasional external and mostly Western stimuli to those who see themselves fighting a defensive jihad to protect both the honour and the physical existence of the threatened Islamic umma, such as the Danish cartoons, Pope Benedict’s speech in August 2006, virulently anti-Islamic movies and books, and a tendency by leading politicians (such as John McCain and Sarah Palin today) to repeatedly speak of an undefined “Islamic radicalism” as a great threat to Western civilisation that must be fought for decades, if not lifetimes.
Karl Rove's sneering statement of liberals' response to terrorism aside, it's clear that the Bush administration's response to Al Qaeda has been a total disaster. BushCo's Global War on Terror has failed not only to stamp out the Al Qaeda movement, it has aided in the recruitment efforts and expansion of the group. As many have pointed out, Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay have done more for Al Qaeda than any call to martyrdom and all that implies.
What does Mr. Khouri suggest?
Any militant movement that endures for 20 years and spurs dozens of smaller clones is not only a consequence of its own organisational prowess. It reflects the persistence of enabling conditions that breed militants and militancy.
If we don’t want to go through this again 20 years from now, we would do well to grasp and change the wider degrading conditions that feed recruits into terror movements, including Arab jails, socio-economic disparity and abuse of power, Israeli occupations, Anglo-American wars and Western Islamophobia. [Emphasis added]
It's a daunting task, and an expensive one, but it certainly has to be less expensive in money and lives than the road chosen by the Bush administration.
121 days
The several phenomena that Al Qaeda represents - defensive jihad, militant self-assertion, a puritanical interpretation of religious doctrine, cosmic theological battle and political struggle to purify tainted Islamic societies - appeal to a wide variety of individuals who gravitate to its call in the same manner that zealots join any other such movements of true believers.
Coming to grips with the phenomena it represents - especially the continuing threat of terrorism - requires grasping the combination of social, economic and political conditions in local societies from which Al Qaeda recruits emanate - mainly in the Arab world, South Asia and immigrant quarters of urban Europe. ...
Over the past two decades, Al Qaeda seems to have evolved in line with trends impacting the wider world of Islamist movements, including local crackdowns in many countries, and the American-led “global war on terror” that has been defined heavily, but not exclusively, by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
These pressures to disrupt Al Qaeda have been offset by a continuation of the stressful conditions at local and national levels in many Arab-Asian societies that nourish these Salafist jihadi movements in the first place. So a more useful question than “What is Al Qaeda’s condition today?” concerns the wider trends in Arab-Asian societies that bolster Islamist radicalism by spurring five related forces:
1. The slow political fragmentation and fraying at the edges of once centralised nation-states like Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, Lebanon, Sudan, Afghanistan and Algeria, creating vacuums of authority that Islamists and others quickly fill.
2. The continued sharp disparities in local delivery of basic social services, job opportunities and security throughout much of the Arab-Asian region, creating urgent needs that Islamists are very good at meeting.
3. The impact of major nationalist issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict or the Anglo-American-led war on Iraq.
4. Police brutality and political oppression at the local level in many Arab-Asian countries (the birthplace of Al Qaeda was both Afghanistan and the prisons of Egypt).
5. Occasional external and mostly Western stimuli to those who see themselves fighting a defensive jihad to protect both the honour and the physical existence of the threatened Islamic umma, such as the Danish cartoons, Pope Benedict’s speech in August 2006, virulently anti-Islamic movies and books, and a tendency by leading politicians (such as John McCain and Sarah Palin today) to repeatedly speak of an undefined “Islamic radicalism” as a great threat to Western civilisation that must be fought for decades, if not lifetimes.
Karl Rove's sneering statement of liberals' response to terrorism aside, it's clear that the Bush administration's response to Al Qaeda has been a total disaster. BushCo's Global War on Terror has failed not only to stamp out the Al Qaeda movement, it has aided in the recruitment efforts and expansion of the group. As many have pointed out, Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay have done more for Al Qaeda than any call to martyrdom and all that implies.
What does Mr. Khouri suggest?
Any militant movement that endures for 20 years and spurs dozens of smaller clones is not only a consequence of its own organisational prowess. It reflects the persistence of enabling conditions that breed militants and militancy.
If we don’t want to go through this again 20 years from now, we would do well to grasp and change the wider degrading conditions that feed recruits into terror movements, including Arab jails, socio-economic disparity and abuse of power, Israeli occupations, Anglo-American wars and Western Islamophobia. [Emphasis added]
It's a daunting task, and an expensive one, but it certainly has to be less expensive in money and lives than the road chosen by the Bush administration.
121 days
Labels: Afghanistan, Terrorism
posted by Diane at 3:00 PM
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